INTRODUCTION
IN CONSUMER DEMAND THEORY the concept of revealed preference is based on the assumption that, by choosing from budget sets, a consumer reveals his preferences over the available commodity bundles. Analogously, in bargaining game theory the agreements reached in bargaining games may be thought to reveal the preferences of the bargainers as a group. In this paper we consider, more generally, single-valued choice functions defined on the convex compact subsets of the positive orthant of Rn. These subsets are called choice situations. In bargaining game theory choice functions are called bargaining solutions and choice situations are called bargaining games. In consumer demand theory choice functions are called demand functions and choice situations are called budget sets. Compact convex budget sets may be regarded as "generalized" budget sets where certain commodity bundles from the full simplices (linear budget sets) are not available. An example is the case of piecewise linear budget sets (see Hausman (1985) ); our results would remain valid under the restriction to this case as well. Works concerned with revealed preference in consumer demand theory are, e.g., Richter (1971) , Varian (1982) , and Pollak (1990) . The latter discusses generalized budget sets.
One purpose of this paper is to find conditions under which a choice function maximizes a real-valued function. In consumer demand theory such a function is called the consumer's utility function. Another purpose is to provide a thorough study of the consequences of the well-known independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) condition. A third purpose is to generalize the Nash bargaining solution.
We will first observe that a choice function maximizes a binary relation if and only if it satisfies IIA. This condition was introduced by Nash in his seminal 1950 paper on the bargaining problem. Next we show that the combination of Pareto optimality and IIA for a choice function in general only excludes cycles of length 1 or 2 in the revealed binary relation. If the dimension is 2, then also cycles of length 3 are excluded, but cycles of length at least 4 may still occur. For the latter case (i.e., n = 2), adding a weak form of continuity called Pareto continuity suffices to exclude circularity of the revealed binary relation; in general, however, even "full" continuity does not exclude cycles. For the case of 2-dimensional linear budget sets, related work was done by Samuelson (1948) and Rose (1958) .
The main result of the paper is obtained by strengthening Pareto continuity to continuity: this condition together with Pareto optimality, and IIA for n = 2 or the (stronger) strong axiom of revealed preference for n > 2, is sufficient for the existence of a function representing the revealed binary relation, i.e., of a function which is maximized by the choice function. We finally show that this representing function must be strongly monotonic and strictly quasiconcave and, conversely, that the existence of a representing function with these properties implies the conditions of continuity, Pareto optimality, IIA, and the strong axiom of revealed preference for the choice function.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 gives elementary definitions and considers the role of IIA. Sections 3 and 4 study the (a)cyclicity of revealed preference without and with continuity conditions, respectively. Section 5 is devoted to the aforementioned main result and briefly discusses an application to bargaining game theory. Section 6 shows that the results can be extended to other domains, and concludes.
2. THE ROLE OF IIA
We denote by X the set of all possible alternatives (for a consumer, a group of bargainers,...). In this paper, with the exception of Section 6, X = 1R++, and a choice situation is a nonempty convex compact subset of X. The collection of all choice situations is denoted by L.
A choice function is a map F: X -),X with F(S) E S for every S E S. Note that in this paper a choice function is single-valued by definition. From F we derive a binary relation R on X as follows: xRy ("x is directly revealed preferred to y") if there is an S E X with x = F(S), y E S.
Sometimes choice functions can be derived from binary relations. A binary relation a on X represents a choice function F if for every choice situation S we have (2.1) {F(S)} = {x E S: x -y for every y in S}, i.e., F uniquely maximizes a on S.
Obviously not every binary relation represents a choice function, and not every choice function can be represented by a binary relation. The following condition will characterize, within the set-up of this paper, the choice functions which can be represented by a binary relation. It was introduced in Nash (1950) for bargaining game theory, and is central in this paper. DEFINITION In order to prove the converse, suppose F satisfies IIA. Define -:= R. Then, for every S E X, F(S) a y for every y E S. We still have to show that F(S) uniquely maximizes a on S, for every S E LX. Suppose there is an S E X with y E S and y a F(S), i.e., yRF(S). Then there is a T e with F(S) E T and y = F(T), so by IIA applied twice, y = F(T n S) = F(S). This completes the proof.
2.1: The choice function F satisfies independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) if for all choice situations S and T with S c T and F(T) E S we have F(S) = F(T).

Q.E.D.
In defending the IIA-condition Nash (1950, p. 195) argues that (two) rational individuals, agreeing on a common choice x from T, should find the agreement to choose x from S c T "of lesser restrictiveness" than the agreement to choose x from T, and thus should also agree to choose x from S. Theorem 2.2 and Formula (2.1) clarify how the presence of fewer points in S may make it "of lesser restrictiveness" to agree on the choice x from S: in S the players must agree on [x -y] for fewer points y. Thus Theorem 2.2 clarifies two ideas which may have been underlying Nash's intuition: firstly, that the two players should choose in accordance with a binary "group preference" relation, and, secondly and more basic, the idea that the two players may be considered as one decision unit on which consistency requirements can be imposed.
Let us further note that Theorem 2.2 essentially depends on the restrictive framework in this paper, in which the choice function is single-valued and has a domain which is intersection-closed. Under more general circumstances many other conditions for choice functions have been formulated in the literature which in the context of this paper are equivalent to IIA. We mention the weak axiom of revealed preference (see Samuelson (1938) ), property a and property 8 of Sen (1971), renamed nonincreasing eligibility and nondecreasing eligibility in Wakker (1989a) , the independence of/from irrelevant alternatives of Luce (1959) and Kaneko (1980) , and the V-axiom of Richter (1971) . Most of these properties were studied in the context of consumer demand theory. Arrow (1959) showed that IIA (called C4 there) is necessary and sufficient for the existence of a transitive complete representing binary relation under the restrictive assumption that the domain of the choice function contains all finite subsets of X.
The next two sections deal with the (a)cyclicity of the binary relation in Theorem 2.2. In Section 3 we consider choice functions without the (Pareto) continuity property; in Section 4 we will add Pareto continuity and continuity. In view of the reflexivity of R (Lemma 3.1(i)) and the definition of P it follows from (3.1) that a ? b, a ?x, b #x. We will show that xJa; in some cases the additional requirement bPx will be needed. Nonexistence of cycles of length 3 then follows immediately. In order to prove xla, we list the following cases, which essentially exhaust all possible configurations of {a, b, x). 
(ii).
This completes the proof of Step 2, and of the lemma.
Q.E.D.
The following example, which was not easy to construct, shows that for n = 2, IIA and PO are not sufficient to exclude cycles of length greater than 3. (ii) On G1,G4, G5,G7, a is the lexicographic order. (iii) On G, G7 6,G8, a is the reversed lexicographic order (first maximizing the second coordinate).
(iv) On Gg, a maximizes the product xax2.
We define F as the choice function maximizing a. It can be seen that F is well-defined, and satisfies IIA, P0, and SARP. We define a to be equal to a with one exception: b a c instead of c a b. So a is not transitive. We define F as the choice function maximizing a. Then also F is well-defined and satisfies P0 and IA (by 
(A)CYCLICITY OF REVEALED PREFERENCE WITH CONTINUITY
The following additional condition for a choice function was introduced in Peters (1986). For n = 2 and S E X, let DI(S) be the point of P(S) with maximal first coordinate, and let D2(S) be the point of P(S) with maximal second coordinate. D1 and D2 are choice functions satisfying PO, IIA, and Pareto continuity but not continuity (see Def. 4.9). Note that for choice functions F satisfying PO and IIA we have F(S) = F(T) whenever P(S) = P(T): so, for such F, requiring Pareto continuity instead of continuity seems reasonable.
The remainder of this section is devoted, firstly, to proving that the combination of PO, PC, and IIA for a choice function F implies SARP if n = 2; secondly, to showing that for n > 2 these conditions, even with full continuity instead of PC, do not suffice to exclude cycles. For x # y, lx(x, y) denotes the straight closed halfline through x and y with endpoint x. Although it is not impossible that R is complete (i.e., xRy or yRx for all x, y e X; for instance let n 2 and F = Di), this will in general not be the case. For instance, if n = 2 and F is the Nash choice function N (that is, N(S) is the point of S CX where the product x1x2 is maximized over S), then neither (1, 2)R (2, 1) nor (2, 1)R(1, 2) ). Also, R does not have to be "representable" by a real-valued function on X; f: X -1 R represents the binary relation a on X if [x y=*f(x)>f(y)]
and [x >-y=f(x)>f(y)] for all x, y e X, where >-is the asymmetric part of a . For instance, if R is revealed by D1 then R is the lexicographic order on X which is well-known not to be representable by a real-valued function.
The main purpose of this section is to find sufficient conditions for F such that the corresponding revealed preference relation R is representable by a real-valued function f. Such a function will be called a utility function (of the consumer, or the group of bargainers). It will be shown that f is strongly monotonic and strictly quasi-concave (see above Lemma 5.4). Up to Theorem 5.3 we assume:
F is continuous and satisfies PO and SARP.
The following lemma can be derived from Corollary 1 in Jaffray (1975) applied to the transitive, asymmetric partial order P. Next we will show that the function f in Theorem 5.3 is strongly monotonic, i.e., strictly increasing in each coordinate, and strictly quasiconcave, i.e., the set {ye X: f(y)>f(x)} is "strictly convex," for every xe X. A set TcX is strictly convex if ax + (1 -a)y is an interior point of T whenever x, y E T, x * y, 0 < a < 1. 
